United Nations member states have now had two opportunities to set out their position on Russia’s invasion of its neighbour Ukraine. Some might argue that the first of these, held on 2 March, so soon after the invasion, offered governments little time to fully develop their policy. Thirty-five nations, including eight Commonwealth members (Bangladesh, India, Mozambique, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda), chose to abstain in that vote.
The stance of these Commonwealth members was raised in ministerial questions in the House of Commons on 31 October. Alicia Kearns, chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and Mark Pritchard both sought comment on this from Foreign Secretary James Cleverly. He could only observe that these abstaining states should recognise who are the real losers in this war, far from the scene of battle.
So why did they abstain in March? India, a founder member of the UN and key player in delivering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, clearly settled for self-interest. Traditionally, it chooses to arm itself with Russian equipment and now benefits through heavily discounted Russian oil purchases. Not very principled. South Africa argued that continuing crises elsewhere, especially in Africa, should be addressed as urgently as that in Ukraine. None would argue, but 141 fellow nations successfully managed to separate that point from the illegality of the Russian invasion, supporting the General Assembly resolution. The other six Commonwealth nations did not publish their opinions. The Westminster United Nations Association wrote to the High Commissioners of all eight seeking explanations for their governments’ stance on the issue. None replied. Had they been overtaken by the suddenness of it all? Maybe.
By the time of the second debate, on 12 October, eight months later, none could argue they were suddenly surprised by developments in Ukraine. Following international outcry, especially from the ‘global south’, the UN, Turkiye and the two combatants had agreed to commence grain and fertiliser shipments, bringing relief to more than one hundred million people. At the same time, the immediate consequences of Russia’s Special Military Operation, claimed initially to ‘protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide’ were clear for all to witness. So, did any of those eight Commonwealth states change their position in the second vote? Only Bangladesh.
The South African delegate piously reaffirmed that ‘the territorial integrity of States, including Ukraine, is sacrosanct, calling on parties to respect international law’. The Indian delegate regretted that ‘as the war unfolds, the entire global South continues to suffer food, fuel and fertilizer shortages, as well as price hikes’. Claiming that there were other pressing issues at play, some not addressed in the resolution, it abstained once more, insisting, though, that ‘India is on the side of peace and will remain firmly there.’ The redoubtable Mrs Hansa Mehta who represented India in human rights negotiations in 1948 would have been appalled by such pusillanimity.
The Pakistan delegate had clearly been instructed to evade the issue, preferring to reference its continuing dispute with India in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, prompting further intra-South Asian tit for tat. But the Bangladesh delegate was unequivocal in explaining its changed stance, reaffirming its belief that respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of all disputes must be universally complied to, without any exception. The other four Commonwealth members I have mentioned did not take to the General Assembly floor, nor change their position.
Can we assume these nations (excepting Bangladesh) have concluded that they have more to gain by abstaining? What can that be? One veteran African commentator told me that ‘the West’ must take its own medicine, citing invasions of Iraq and Kosovo without the clear authority of the UN Security Council. Even though neither of these were neighbour states, and their leaders had already begun to cruelly attack their own people, the general observation is well understood. Countless lesser, unrequested Western interventions over decades understandably led young nationalists in post-colonial countries to accept valuable Soviet offers in education and wider support at the UN. Their longevity of their gratitude is understandable. But surely the two UN debates on the invasion of Ukraine were not the best-chosen platforms for now senior national leaders to demonstrate their thanks to Moscow for its help in decades past. We urge them to think again.
PERSPECTIVES 